Sunday, March 06, 2005
Was Eason Jordan Right? The Giuliana Sgrena Fiasco
Unless you have a real short attention span, you remember the uproar over CNN executive Eason Jordan's comments to the effect that the US military has targetted journalists.
The American political spectrum, left and right, practitioners and spectators, rose as one to condemn the man, ending his career at CNN and perhaps as a media executive.
But of course Jordan was literally correct -- even when he spoke. See here.
Now comes the case of La Sregna. Wounded by American soldiers after being released by Iraqi kidnappers, she held the Italian intelligence agent who secured her release as he died, victim of an American bullet. Made for a TV movie, that. But enough of the drama, let's do a little analysis.
The US military put out the story that the vehicle -- indeed the first term used was convoy --was 'speeding' toward a checkpoint, that the soldiers manning the checkpoint had flashed lights, fired a flare, fired warning shots, and finally shot into the engine block of the vehicle.
Does this make any sense? Well, there are two ways of moving a high profile person in dangerous territory.
(1) Assemble a large convoy, travel with your cargo at a high rate of speed to your destination. This is the sort of strategy employed by GW Bush wherever he goes. It can be duplicated at a much smaller scale.
(2) Make your vehicle as non-descript as possible, travel at a normal rate of speed, in general avoid attracting attention to yourself.
The US account makes it appear that those in charge of Sregna had opted for the first strategy, get the package in a secure vehicle and hightail it across the desert, to the airport, and out of the country. But any idiot knows that this strategy means informing those normally in charge of security, in order to secure an obstacle free route. In a dangerous environment like Iraq, it also requires close and continual contact with 'friendly' security forces while the operation is taking place. In other words, the Italians should have had the way cleared for them, the American checkpoints along the way should have known the 'convoy' was coming, when it was due to arrive at their checkpoints, and should have been receiving tracking updates.
So, did the Italians screw up by attempting this strategy, but failing to notify the US forces in the sector? That would certainly account for the incident as the US military describes it. The Italian driver, thinking the way clear, barrelled down on a US checkpoint, and the rest is history.
Unfortunatly for the US military's version, testimony from Sregna and others suggests that the Italians were following strategy 2. Don't attract attention to yourself. He is are two paragraphs from an account leaked from the Italian investigators, published in ABC of Spain . [ABC is monarchist, conservative, and if not wildly pro-American, definitely not anti-American]
The story goes on to say the one of the agents was in communication, via cell phone, with the head of Italian military intelligence, who was in the office of the presidency (in Rome). The whole event was heard -- this might be very bad news for the US version.
The American political spectrum, left and right, practitioners and spectators, rose as one to condemn the man, ending his career at CNN and perhaps as a media executive.
But of course Jordan was literally correct -- even when he spoke. See here.
Now comes the case of La Sregna. Wounded by American soldiers after being released by Iraqi kidnappers, she held the Italian intelligence agent who secured her release as he died, victim of an American bullet. Made for a TV movie, that. But enough of the drama, let's do a little analysis.
The US military put out the story that the vehicle -- indeed the first term used was convoy --was 'speeding' toward a checkpoint, that the soldiers manning the checkpoint had flashed lights, fired a flare, fired warning shots, and finally shot into the engine block of the vehicle.
Does this make any sense? Well, there are two ways of moving a high profile person in dangerous territory.
(1) Assemble a large convoy, travel with your cargo at a high rate of speed to your destination. This is the sort of strategy employed by GW Bush wherever he goes. It can be duplicated at a much smaller scale.
(2) Make your vehicle as non-descript as possible, travel at a normal rate of speed, in general avoid attracting attention to yourself.
The US account makes it appear that those in charge of Sregna had opted for the first strategy, get the package in a secure vehicle and hightail it across the desert, to the airport, and out of the country. But any idiot knows that this strategy means informing those normally in charge of security, in order to secure an obstacle free route. In a dangerous environment like Iraq, it also requires close and continual contact with 'friendly' security forces while the operation is taking place. In other words, the Italians should have had the way cleared for them, the American checkpoints along the way should have known the 'convoy' was coming, when it was due to arrive at their checkpoints, and should have been receiving tracking updates.
So, did the Italians screw up by attempting this strategy, but failing to notify the US forces in the sector? That would certainly account for the incident as the US military describes it. The Italian driver, thinking the way clear, barrelled down on a US checkpoint, and the rest is history.
Unfortunatly for the US military's version, testimony from Sregna and others suggests that the Italians were following strategy 2. Don't attract attention to yourself. He is are two paragraphs from an account leaked from the Italian investigators, published in ABC of Spain . [ABC is monarchist, conservative, and if not wildly pro-American, definitely not anti-American]
Giuliana Sgrena y el agente herido manifestaron que «no era un control sino una patrulla, que nos disparó apenas encendieron un faro. No habíamos encontrado controles anteriores y no sabíamos de dónde venían los proyectiles». En rechazo frontal de la versión americana, ambos manifestaron que «debido a las circunstancias, no íbamos deprisa. La velocidad de nuestro automóvil no justificaba abrir fuego. Era una velocidad regular y no era susceptible de equívocos».
[Julia Sgrena and the wounded agent said that 'it wasn't a checkpoint, but a patrol, that fired on us barely [after] turning on a headlight [perhaps spotlight]. We hadn't encountered checkpoints previously and didn't know where the projectiles were coming from.' In a direct contradiction to the American version, both maintained that 'due to the circumstances, we weren't travelling fast. The speed of our vehicle didn't justify opening fire. It was a regular speed and there was no way this was able to be mistaken.'
The story goes on to say the one of the agents was in communication, via cell phone, with the head of Italian military intelligence, who was in the office of the presidency (in Rome). The whole event was heard -- this might be very bad news for the US version.
